Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

State of Utah, In The Interest of Michael Patrick
Kelsey, A Person Under 18 Years of Age : Brief of
Appellants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Robert C. Cummings; Attorney for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, In Re: Kelsey, No. 10840 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4023

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest of
MICHAEL PATRICK KELSEY,
a person under 18 years of age.

Case No.

10840

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Decree of the District Juvenile Court
for Utah County, State of U1ah,
Honorable .M. J. Paxman, Judge

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
700 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorn,ey for .AppeUotals

FILED

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General of
the State of Utah
M.1W 1 -1967
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
________ _ __ _____
.
Attorney for Respondent c1 ... ~. Supremo Court, Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -----------------------------------------DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ___________________________

1
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS -----------------------------------------------ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------POINT 1. The Decree directing appellants to return Michael Patrick Kelsey to his natural
father is not supported by the Findings of Fact ____

2
9
9

POINT 2. The evidence does not support the
finding that the natural father cannot be found
to be unfit or incompetent or to have abandoned Michael and clearly preponderates
against that finding, and reasonable minds
could not differ in concluding that the natural
parents are unfit and incompetent. ---------------------- 18
POINT 3. Appellants' petition for leave to adopt
and the hearing thereof on April 7, 1966, satisfies the provisions of Subsection 55-10-109(2). ____ 21
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105,
388 P. 2d 230 (1964) ____________________________________________________ 17
Family Law, 1960 Annual Survey of American Law ________ 17
In re State in Interest of Black,
3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P. 2d 887 (1955) ____________________________ 17

In re State of Utah, in Interest of R ... L.... ,
17 Utah 2d 349, 411 P.2d 839 (1966) ________________________ 16
Oleen v. Oleen, 15 Utah 2d 326, 392 P. 2d 792 (1964) ____ 17
State in Interest of C., 9 Utah 2d 345, 344
P. 2d 981 (1959) ____________________________________________________________ 17

Page
State in Interest of K ___ B_ ___ ,
7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P. 2d 395 (1958)_ -------------------------- 17
State in Interest of L.J.J.,
11 Utah 2d 393, 360 P. 2d 486 (1961) ________________________ 17
Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Section 55-10-32 (repealed) __________________________________ 15, 16
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Section 55-10-63 ------------------------------------------------------------ 15
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-64 (10) ______________________________________________ 12
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-64 (14) ______________________________________________ 12
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Section 55-10-77 --------·--------------------------------------------- 12, 13
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-77 ( 5) ________________________________________________ 12
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Section 55-10-98 ------------------------------------------------------------ 21
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Section 55-10-100 ---------------------------------------------------------- 13
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-100 (16) ____________________________________________ 13
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-100 (18) ____________________________________________ 14
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-100 (19) ____________________________________________ 15
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Section 55-10-109 ---------------------------------------- 9, 11, 13, 16 > 18
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
Subsection 55-10-109 (2) __________________________________________?:_,_J 22
Utah Code Annotated
Section 55-10-112
Utah Code Annotated
Section 55-10-122

1953, as amended,
-------------------------------------------------------- 5, 6
1953, as amended,
------·-·------------------------------------------------- 16

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATJ1~

OF UTAH, in the Interest of

MICHAEL PATRICK KELSEY,
a pPrson undPr 18 years of age.

Case No.
10840

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Apiwal from the Decree of the District Juvenile Court
for Utah County, State of Utah,
Honorable M. J. Paxman, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a proceeding in which appellants seek leave
to adopt the said minor, Michael Patrick Kelsey.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was heard before the Hon. M. J. Paxman, Judge of the Juvenile Court for Utah County, State
of Utah, and from a decree adjudging that the care,
custody, control and guidance of said Michael Patrick
Kelsey are awarded to his natural father and directing

appellants, Leonard and Patsy Oldham, to forthwith return said .Michael Patrick Kelsey to l1is said fathf~r,
appellants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of said decree and judgment granting petitioners leave to adopt said Michael
Patrick Kelsey, or that failing a new hearing.
STAT'EMENT OF FACTS
The record on appeal in this matter consists of the
main record hereinafter referred to as (R.); a supplemental record hereinafter referred to as (S. R.); transcript of hearing January 7, 1963, hereinafter referred
to as (T1); and transcript of hearing April 7, 1966 hereinafter referred to as (T 2 ).
That by decree of the Juvenile Court for Utah
County entered January 7, 1963, said Michael Patrick
Kelsey, hereinafter referred to as l\fichael, was declared
neglected and dependant and was placed with the Utah
County Department of Public Welfare for foster care
( R. 9). This decree was based upon a finding of said
court that the natural mother and legal custodian of the
child had psychological problems interfering with her
ability to provide a proper home for him (R. 9).
The natural father of the child, David L. Kelsey,
testified on January 7, 1963, that he was not in a position
to give the child a home (T1 2). The matter was reviewed
agam .T anuary 6, 1964; there was no change as to the
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order com·erning .Michael (R. 14). An order for continuance was entered January 13, 1965 (R. 17).
Petitioners received the custody of said Michael on
or about l\lay 7, 1963 when he was 3 years of age (R. 9)
and he is still in their custody (T 2 5, R. 49, S.R. 40). On
March 28, 1966, appellants filed a peti6on in said juvenile
court asking for leave of said court to adopt said Michael
Thereafter a summons was served upon the natural
father, David L. Kelsey (R. 21), and upon the natural
mother, Tera.lee S. Neeley (R. 22). The hearing of said
petition was held on April 7, 1966. The natural parents
appeared with their attorney, Herbert B. Maw. The
petitioners and appellants appeared in person and by
their attorney, Robert C. Cummings.
Appellants were married November 16, 1940 (T 2 3),
and they testified that they have eight children including
Michael (T 2 3). Appellants are employed as psychiatric
technicians for the State of California, Department of
Mental Hygiene (T 2 2, 30). Appellants have a stable and
happy marriage (T 2 3, 11) and are family oriented (T 2
4, 31). Michael has been accepted in the home of appellants the same as if he had been born to them (T 2 12, 13).
He treats them as his parents (T 2 10, 33) and has no
recollection of his natural parents (T 2 9, 12, 16). He has
been in the home of appellants since he was three years
of age (R. 9). When he came into the home of appellants
he had serious problems of fear and anxiety (T2 6, 8, 32).
Since being in the home of appellants he has developed
into a fine, healthy, young boy (T·2 9, 10).
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Dean Odell Peck, a teacher at Sacramento ,Junior
College, testified to the stability of appellants home and
to the good adjustment Michael has madP in it (T:.i 18-21).
Testimony to the same effect was given by Bonnie Peck
(T 2 22-24), and by Melvin l\Iiller, a member of the armed
forces (T 2 28-30). Dr. Steven L. VanWagonen, Michael's
physician, testified that in his opinion taking Michael
from appellants would have the following result: "I
would estimate that it probably would upset him emotionally and would probably aggravate the bed wetting
and increase it." (T 2 27).
Apparently the natural mother does not seek custody
of Michael (S.R. 1). As of October 15, 1963, she had
remarried and was pregnant ( S.R. 1). It appears that as
of January 12, 1965, she had 3 children in her home under
six years of age (S.R. 17). Report of March 4, 1965,
indicates 4 children under 6 in her home (S.R. 23).
The natural father, David L. Kelsey, has been divorced from the natural mother, Teralee Kelsey (R. 1).
Thf' natural father is employed ( T 2 38) and now married
to Grace Montano. They were married May 26, 1965
( T 2 41) although it appears the natural father misrepresented his marital status to the juvenile court theretofore (R. 17). The natural father's present wife was
married before and had six children by said marriage;
their custody was awarded to their father (T 2 63). One
of these children was with David L. Kelsey and his presPnt wife at the time of the hearing (T 2 42). The natural
fathPr, David L. Kelsey an<l his present wife are of dif-
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ferent religious faiths ( T~ 42, 66). Two other children
of the natural parents, who were taken from them at
the time Michael was, have since been returned to the
natural father and his present wife (R. 14). At the
time of the hearing of April 7, 1966, the natural father
and his present wife had some difficulty in their home
between the natural father's children and his present
wife's child (T 2 49). It appeared that while the natural
father's three children were together there was some
problem between Michael and his older brother, Kelly
arising from personality differences (T 2 45, 53). The
natural father is an occasional drinker (T 2 52) and testified that he had a lot of bills ( T 2 52).
At the conclusion of the hearing on April 7, 1966, the
court requested briefs from counsel and same were filed
(R. 4-0, 46). Attorney for the natural father at the time
of filing his brief also filed a petition for custody (R. 47).
Said petition has not yet been heard.
On January 11, 1967, the said Juvenile Court made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Decree (R. 48, 49).
Thereafter on petition of appellants an order was entered
on January 20, 1967, staying said decree (R. 51, 50) in
accordance with Section 55-10-112, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended. Appellants filed their notice of appeal
February 8, 196'7. The main record including transcripts
\\~as filed in this court March 14, 1967.
A supplemental record was filed in the Supreme
Court April 6, 1967. Said supplemental record contains
the social studies and reports in this matter which are
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as part of the record pursuant to said Section
5:5-10-112. The report of "\Villiam L. Bailey, Jr. dated
:M areh 18, 1964 ( S.R. 7), revealPd that Michael was
idt>ntifying vt>ry closely with appellants and that his
feelings for his foster siblings "have heen identified as
very wann and affectionate as theirs is for him." Foster
Care Review of Dallas C. Thompson dated October 20,
19()4 (S.R. 8), showed that l\Jichael's adjustment in thr
home of appellants appears to be sound. Report of
October 30, 1964, of Fay R. Nelson, child welfare worker,
indicated some difficulty in obtaining information from
the natural father and his present wife and indicates
problems between the natural father's present wife and
her own children, and contains the suggestion that
Michael not be returned at that time (S.R. 13, 14). Social
Study by child welfare worker, Dallas C. Thompson,
dated January 12, 1965 (S.R. 16-19) reveals misrepresentations on the part of the natural father in connection
\\-ith obtaining his other two children and points out
that the natural father has little concern or insight into
the needs and welfare of his children. He recommends
that the natural father be permanently deprived of the
eustody of l\f ichael and that serious consideration should
lw given as to whether or not the other two children
should he removed from his custody ( S.R. 18). He also
n'comrnended that the natural mother not receive Michael
at that time (S.R. 17). His conclusion was that the next
hearing should determine whether Michael should be
n~quired

returm•d to his natural mother or "whether an adoptive
ordPr should be givt'n an<l l\fiehael allowed to stay in the
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present home when• he is residing, a home that is very
strong and in which Michael has obtained a solid adjustment and a houw in which adoption is both possible and
desirable." A social study dated March 15, 1965 (S.R.
:20-22) points out that the natural father appears to be
a very immature person, and points out a rather nebulous
relationship between the natural father and his present
wife, hut does indicate a good relationship between the
natural father and the two children in his custody, and
although the report questions whether these two children
should remain with the father, it concludes that for the
prPsent they should. There seems to have been no issue
of returning Michael at that time (S.R. 20). In a sooial
study dated March 17, 1965, by Dallas C. Thompson,
child welfare worker, his recommendation was that the
appPllants be allowed to adopt Michael. He pointed out
that replacing Michael, according to the best knowledge
in the field of child welfare, would be devastating to
him ( S.R. 25). Recommendation that appellants be allowed to adopt Michael was renewed in report of said
Dallas C. Thompson, dated May 11, 1965 (S.R. 27). In
social study by John K. Taylor, child welfare worker,
dated August 30, 1965, it is recommended that the parents
he permanently deprived and that appellants be allowed
to adopt Michael stating that his records reflect a history
of immaturity and promiscuity on behalf of both parents

(S.R. 28).
The record contains a letter dated September 29,
1965, from George E. Ballif, Deputy County Attorney
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of Ptah County (S.R. 30) in which he states his opinion
that the natural parents cannot be permanently deprived
of eustody of Michael. Tlwreafter .John K. Taylor, child
welfare worker, made a report to the court on October
20, 1965, in whieh he states that assmning a permanent
order cannot be given "it may be better to formulate
other plans such as returning to one of his natural parents before too much additional time lapses which delay
will impose a hardship upon the Oldhams and may delay
Michael's adjusting to a new home situation." In a social
study by John K. Taylor, child welfare worker, dated
February 9, 1966, it was recommended that Michael be
returned to his father. This review refers to the aforesaid letter by attorney Ballif as follows: "Since the last
review a letter requesting permanent deprivation was
originated, however, Attorney Ballif, decreed the agency
had insufficient evidence for such an order" (S.R. 40).
A social study dated December 29, 1962, indicates prob-

lems with the natural parents in the area of promiseuity ( S.R. 42, 43).

A report dated November 17,

1965, by .James A. Anderson indicates a measure of
stability had been achieved by the natural father and
expresses the opinion that the natural father and his
present wife have the "ability" to care for Michael ( S.R.
37). The natural father has paid support money for
Michael (T 2 40). '"Phe natural father has not seen Michael
sinee he was 3 years of age (T'.! 40, 41).
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DECREE DIRECTING APPELLANTS TO RETURN
MICHAEL PATRICK KELSEY TO HIS NATURAL FATHER
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT.

In its findings of fact (R. 49) the Juvenile Court
makeR the following finding:

"It appears to the Court, from the evidence
presented, that Michael's best welfare would be
Rerved by remaining in the foster home provided
hy the Oldhams ... "

The Court then goes on to state in effect that nevertheless it does not feel that it is allowed under Section
55-10-109 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, to make
any other order, since at the time of the hearing the
court does not find the natural father unfit, incompetent
or to have abandoned Michael. It is the appellants' contention that once the court finds that the best welfare
of a child requires that he remain in a foster home, a
decree depriving them of the child cannot be justified,
where that situation is one brought about by the
natural parents. Michael was placed in a foster home
only because neither pa.rent could adequately provide
for him. Under such circumstances the parents must
assume the consequences of their action. It is not argued
that in all cases a child should be placed where his best
interest requires. If this were so, a child could be removed from a home no matter how good, and placed in
another home as long as the new home would in general
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lw better for the ehild. That is not the case here, how-

ln this case the ehild was placed with appellants
not just because they could give him more than his natural part>nts, hut becamw his natural parents could not
provide for him. The child is thus placed in a new environment not by outsided authority alone, but by the
aet of the parents. The natural parents having thus
created the situation, rannot romplain of its consequences, and particularly cannot thereafter insist upon
a course of aetion contrary to the best interests of the
ehild. 'rlrns a ehild cannot be taken from parents and
given to another just because the other can give the
ehild more. But where the parent gives up the ehild,
for whatever reason, and plact>s the child in a condition
or situation which result in certain needs for that child,
then the parent's rights must become subordinate to the
best interest of the child. If the child's best interest
requires that he remain where he is, then this must
control. Such is the case here. Due to the natural
mother's mental illness and inadequacy and due to the
~~w·r.

natural father's inability to care for the child, Michael
was placed with other parents when he was three years
old. The evidence shows that appellants are now in the
eyes of the child his rea.l parents. To take this child from
the only parents he remembers and to place him with a
father he does not remember and with a step mother,
whom he has never even met, is not only against his
hest interest, as the court found, but would be inhuman.
\Vt> cannot suppose that the legislature ever intended
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such a rt>sult to follow from tht> wording of said Section
55-10-109.
lt is evident that the juvenile court felt compelled
because of its interpretation of Section 55-10-109 to
deprive appellants of Michael. If this court decides that
the juvenile court was not compelled, as it thought it
was, to take Michael from appellants, then since the
juvenile court has found it in his best interest to stay
with appellants, this Court can and should reverse said
deeree and grant appellants leave to adopt said minor,
or at the very least the decree should be reversed and
the case returned to the juvenile court for action in the
light of the interpretation given said section by this
Court.

The juvenile court concluded that Section 55-10-109
m this case compelled the court to take Michael from
appellants and return him to his natural father. This
seems to be based upon his finding that the "natural
father cannot be found to be unfit or incompetent or
to have abandoned Michael." This of course is a finding
as of the last hearing of April 7, 1966, since the court
found the child neglected and dependent initially on
.r anuary 7, 1963 (R. 9). Appellants submit that this
initial finding under Utah law permits the court to
permanently deprive a natural parent of custody where
thereafter the best interest of the child requires it. This is
eertainly the case under the law as it existed on January
7, 1963, when the child was found to be neglected and
dt>pendent and appellant submits that is the same under
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th<> law of Utah a:-1 it existed on the date of the last hearing on April 7, 19G7, and on the date of the decree appealed from, .January 11, 1967. This appears evident
from an examination of the law.
8ection 55-10-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
a11u:•nded (all statutory references herein are to the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, unless otherwise indicated) enumerates the areas, unless otherwise provided
by law, in which the juvenile court has exclusive original
jurisdiction. Subsection ( 5) thereof provides: "To terminate the legal parent-child relationship, including
termination of residual parental rights and duties as
defined herein." The phrase, "Residual parental rights
and duties," is defined in Subsection 55-10-64 (10) as
follows:
''Residual parental rights and duties" means
those rights and duties remaining with the parent
after legal custody or guardianship, or both, have
been vested in another person or agency, including, but not limited to, the responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption, the right
to determine the child's religious affiliation, and
the right to reasonable visitation unless restricted
by the court. If no guardian has been appointed,
"residual parental rights and duties" also include
the right to consent to marriage, to enlistment,
and to consent to major medical, surgical, or
psychiatric treatment.
The phrase "Termination of parental right" is defined in Subsection 55-10-64 (14) as follows:
"Termination of parental rights" means the per-
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manent elimination of all parental rights and
duties, including residual parental rights and
duties, by court order.
Section 55-10-100 enumerates the various dispositions the juvenile court can make of a case once the court
acquires jurisdiction of a child in accordance with Secti on 55-10-77. Subsection 55-10-100 (16) provides:
The court may terminate all parental rights provided that the provisions of section 55-10-109 are
complied with.
Section 55-10-109 provides that the court may decree
a termination of all parental rights with respect to one
or both parents if the court finds:
(a) That the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child; or
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned
the child ...
( c) That after a period of trial, during which the
child was left in his own home under protective
supervision or probation, or during which the
child was returned to live in his own home, the
parent or parents substantially and continuously
or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child
proper parental care and protection.
It appears that the issue of the fitness or competence of the parents by reason of conduct or condition
refers to the time the court acquires jurisdiction of the
case at least it appears that being unfit or incompetent
at that time satisfies the statute. In the first place, it
is the initial conduct or condition which makes it neces-
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for tlw court to assume jurisdiction, and certainly
the parents must bear the responsibility for circwnstaneps whieh arise as the result of juvenile court action,
including foster homes, Pk. Thus if a child makes a
wholesome adjustment in a foster home and it appears
for his best interest that the child remain in that home,
the parents eannot be heard to complain just because
in the meantime they have improved their situation. The
praents must bear the responsibility for whatever situation their original conduct has brought about. Further,
Subsection 55-10-100 (18) states:
sar~·

Before depriving any parent of the custody of his
or her child, the court shall give due consideration
to the preferred right of parents to the custody
of their children, as expressed in section 55-10-63,
and shall not tr an sfer custody to another person,
agency, or institution, unless the court finds from
all the circumstances in the case that the welfare
of the child or the public interest requires that
the child be taken from his home.
Thus the Act expressly provides that the juvenile
court once jurisdiction attaches, can deprive a parent of
custody where the welfare of the child requires it. No
time limit is set so it appears the court can deprive the
parent indefinitely so long as the welfare of the child
requires it. It cannot be supposed that the legislature
intended to provide that despite the change in or repentence of the parent, the court (where the welfare of
the child requires it) can in effect deprive the parent of
custody of the child in effect without time limit but cannot terminate parental rights in such a case. Such a
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result \Yould be ridiculous.
!15-10-100 ( 19) provides :

Furthermore, Subsection

An order under this section for probation or
placement of a child with an individual or an
agency shall include a date certain for a review
of the case by the court, with a new date to be
set upon each review. In reviewing foster home
placements, special attention shall be given to
making adoptable children available for adoption
without delay.
The foregoing Subsection seems to show a preference
on the part of the legislature for adoption rather than
an extended deprivation of custody situation with reviews from time to time. Section 55-10-63 states that the
act shall be liberally construed to achieve the goals there
set forth which appear basically to be the welfare of the
child and the best interest of the state.
Under the old act it was provided in Section 55-10-32
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
No child as defined in this chapter shall be taken
from the custody of its parents or legal guardian
without the consent of such parents or legal
guardian, unless the court shall find from the evidence introduced in the case that such parent or
legal guardian is incompetent, or has knowingly
failed and neglected to provide for such child the
proper maintenance, care, training, and education
contemplated and required by both law and
morals, or unless a child being a ward of the court,
has been tried on probation in the custody of its
parents or legal guardian and has failed to reform; or unless either parent, having full custody
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and control over a child, or the child's legal
t,111ardian, has been convicted of a felony; or unless the court shall find from all circumstances in
the case that the public welfare or the welfare of
a child requires that his custody be taken from its
parents or legal guardian.
Said Section 55-10-109 appears to be substantially the
same as said section 55-,10-32 as far as the grounds for
taking a child from its parents are concerned. Hence
by virtue of Section 55-10-122 (which is hereinafter set
out) Section 55-10-109 is to be construed as a restatement and continuation of said Section 55-10-32 and not
as a new enactment. Said Section 55-10-122 provides:
The provisions of this act, to the extent that they
are substantially the same as existing statutory
provisions relating to the same subject matter,
shall be construed as restatements and continuations thereof, and not as new enactments.
It follows that Supreme Court decisions under the

old law will attach to the new law in this area. In the
case of In re State of Utah, in the Interest of R ...... L ...... ,
a minor child, 17 Utah2d 349, 411 P.2nd 839, this Court
refused to reverse the decree of the juvenile court permanently depriving a parent of the custody of her child
despite the alleged rehabilitation of the parent where
this court found in effect that it was in the best interest
of the child to remain ·with the foster parents.
In other cases this Court has made it clear that in
custody matters the welfare of the child comes first.
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In the case of Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah2d 105, 388
P.2d 230, at page 107 this Court said:

This court has consistently declared that in custody maters the paramount consideration is the
welfare of the child.
ln Oleen v. Oleen, 15 U.2d 326, 392 P.2d 792 this court
said at page 329:
Child custody cases are highly equitable in character and the controlling factor in such cases is
usually the best interest and welfare of the child.
Further, the best interest of the child seems to have been
paramount in the following cases: State in Interest of
K ______ B_ _____ , 7 U.2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958). State in Interest of C, 9 U.2d 345, 344 P.2d 981 (1959); In re State in
Interest of Black, 3 U.2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955); and
State in Interest of L.J .•J., 11 U.2d 393, 360 P.2d 486
(1961).
There is certainly no indication that the legislature
intended to change the foregoing in any way in enacting
the new juvenile court law. In accord with the view that
the best interest of the child is paramount is the following statement by Henry H. Foster, Jr. in Family Law,
1960 Annual Survey of American Law at page 420:
"Obviously, both flexibility and discretion are
necessary and desirable. But there should be certain guideposts. For example, in determining
what really is in the 'best interests' of the child,
prima facie one having de facto custody, if a 'fit
person,' should be awarded custody over a parent
whose only basis for claim is blood relationship.
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Aetual bonds of lon' and affection should prevail
over hypothetical ones. Moreover, the preference
of a child competent to choose should be prima
facie determinativP. Courts should not adopt the
pt>rspeetive that a natural parent has a vested
property interest in a child nor start with the
naive premise that the 'best interests' of the child
inexorably require an award to the parent. Courts
should have the responsibility of seeing to it that
all relevant data concerning the child's actual
welfare appear in the record, so that an intelligent
and humane decision may be reached. In many
eases expert testimony and background investigations and reports by court personnel would be
helpful or are essential.''

POINT 2
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING
THAT THE NATURAL FATHER CANNOT BE FOUND TO
BE UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT OR TO HA VE ABANDONED
MICHAEL AND CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST
THAT FINDING, AND REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT
DIFFER IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NATURAL PARENTS ARE UNFIT AND INCOMPETENT.

The record reveals immaturity and indiscretion on
the part of the natural father and mother. Even so it is
not necessary that appellants demonstrate that the
natural parents are evil or disreputable persons. It is
nevertheless appellants'position that they are unfit and
incompetent within the meaning of said Section 55-10-109.
Said Section provides: "(a) That the parent or parents
are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child ... "
It is submitted that the conduct of the father in giv-
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ing up the child in the first place at the agP of :3, whirh
conduct has result in and necessitated leaving Michael
in foster can~ until he is now 7 years of age (lw will lw
t\ on .July :30, 1967) render him unfit and incompetent
within tlw meaning of the statute. It is submitted that
his present condition where the testimony shows trouble
in his present home between his ehildren and a child of
his present wife render him unfit and incompetent within
the meaning of the statute. End<:'r the statute, a person
is unfit and incompetent where his conduct or condition
is seriously detrimental to the child. Thus the determining· factor is whether the conduct or condition is detrimental to the child, not whether the conduct or condition
is wilfull, careless, malicious, noble, or self-sacrificing in
and of itself. It is submitted that under the statute a
person of unexcelled righteousness, engaged in the noblest pursuit is unfit and incompetent if this conduct is
detrimental to the child. Thus for example a self-sacrificing physician dedicating his life to the furthering of the
science of medicine and to saving lives might well be
found unfit if in so doing he was not giving adequate
time and attention to his child, or if in the process was
subjecting his child to needless hazard. Thus in this
<'.ase although the father has paid support for Michael,
although he has remarried, and although he underst.andably wants Michael, and although he has apparently stabilir,ro his life to some degree at least, these virtues and
any others that could be named do not make him fit and
eompetent within the meaning of the statute if it would
be seriously detrimental to Michael to return him. The
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natural fatlu•r is a stranger to Michael, his present wife
is a 8trangPr and the ('hilclren in the natural fathers
home are strangers to Michael. All of this was hrought
ahout hy the natural father and it is his "condition"; and
it is this condition which makes him unfit and incompetent within the meaning of the statute. Reasonable minds
could not differ, it is submitted, that it would be seriously
detrimental to Michael or any child to take him from
the only parents, brothers, sisters, and environment
which he knows and to place him with strangers, even
though one of these strangers is his natural father.
Fnder the facts of this case, every presumption usually
indulged in favor of a natural parent must in fact be
construed to apply to appellants for in the eyes of
Michael they are his natural and only parents. The
needs of Michael demand that he remain with appellants.
This Court is compelled under the facts and law to so
hold, or at the very least this Court can and should hold
that the juvenile court does have authority to deprive
the natural parents of Michael's custody, and remand
the case for further proceedings.
The social studies and reports are practically uniform in recommending that appellants be allowed to
adopt Michael. It is only after Deputy County Attorney,
George E. Ballif, ruled that there were no grounds for
permanent deprivation that the social studies recommended that Michael be returned to the natural father.
It is obvious that this recommendation was based on

that ruling. If this Court decides that the parents can
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permanently be deprived under the facts and law, then
clearly the social studies should be accepted which recommend that appellants be allowed to adopt Michael as
these are not based upon an erroneous legal conclusion.

POINT 3
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR LEA VE TO ADOPT
AND THE HEARING THEREOF ON APRIL 7, 1966, SATISFIES THE PROVISIONS OF SUBSECTION 55-10-109(2).

Although petitioners in their petition do not use the
words, "termination of parental rights," but rather ask
for leave to adopt, the meaning is the same. The words
"termination of parental rights'' are of necessity included in the word, "adopt." There can be no adoption
without such a termination. The phrase, "leave to adopt"
cannot have failed to convey to the natural parents and
to their attorney that the issue at the hearing would be
the termination of their parental rights as well as the
fitness of the foster parents. Thus it would seem the
phrase, "leave to adopt," could only have the meaning
of termination of parental rights as far as the natural
parents are concerned.
Further, it is evident from the transcript that the
issue of the termination of parental rights was in foot
tried before the court at the hearing April 7, 1966.
Further, it should be noted that Section 55-10-98 provides:
When it appears during the course of any proceeding in a children's case that the evidence
presented points to material facts not alleged in
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the iwtition, the court may proceed to consider
forthwith the additional or different matters
raised by the evidence, if the parties consent. In
such event the court on motion of any interested
party or on its own motion shall direct that the
petition be amended to conform to the evidence.
If the amendment results in a substantial departure from the facts originally alleged, the court
sh~ll grant such continuance as justice may reqmre.
By presenting evidence on the issue of tennination
of parental rights it would appear that the parties have
consented to the court considering the matter of tennination of parental rights, and the court on its own motion
can amend the petition to conform. Further, it must be
remembered that the natural parents were represented
by capable counsel at said hearing.
Appellants in their brief (R. 36) pointed out to the
couflt that it could amend the petition to conform to the
evidence, and in the event the court did not do so, asked
leave to amend to conform to the evidence. The court
did not specifically act upon this motion. All in all there
has been a substantial compliance with the provision
of Subsection 55-10-109 (2). However, if this court holds
otherwise on this issue, the decree should nevertheless
be reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile
court for another hearing held in compliance with this
Court's decision.

CONOLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the decree of the juvenile
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court reqmrmg appellant:,; to return :Michael Patrick
Kelsey to his natural father should be reversed and appellants granted leave to adopt, or failing that the said
decree should be reversed and the case remanded to the
juvenile court for a further hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
700 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellams

